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The fact that humans cooperate with non-kin in large groups, or with people they will never meet again, is a long-standing
evolutionary puzzle. Altruism, the capacity to perform costly acts that confer benefits on others, is at the core of cooperative
behavior. Behavioral experiments show that humans have a predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish non-cooperators
at personal cost (so-called strong reciprocity) which, according to standard evolutionary game theory arguments, cannot arise from
selection acting on individuals. This has led to the suggestion of group and cultural selection as the only mechanisms that can
explain the evolutionary origin of human altruism. We introduce an agent-based model inspired on the Ultimatum Game, that
allows us to go beyond the limitations of standard evolutionary game theory and show that individual selection can indeed give rise
to strong reciprocity. Our results are consistent with the existence of neural correlates of fairness and in good agreement with
observations on humans and monkeys.
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Ever since Darwin first faced this problem (Darwin,
1871; Gould, 2002), the arising of human cooperation
has been a subject of intense debate within the frame-
work of evolutionary theories. Cooperation has been
linked to altruism, which can be defined as the capacity
to perform costly acts that confer benefits on others
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). Previous theoretical
approaches to altruism have shown that in many
instances altruistic behavior is not truly so, in so far as
they yield benefits for the altruist in the future. This is
the case when the recipients of the altruistic act are
relatives, well understood within kin selection theory
(Hamilton, 1964). Altruism in the absence of kin
relationships has also been explained in terms of
repeated interaction leading to cooperation (Axelroding author. Tel.: +34916 249 411;
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ess: anxo@math.uc3m.es (A. Sa´nchez).and Hamilton, 1981; Trivers, 1971), indirect benefit
through reputation gains (Leimar and Hammerstein,
2001; Milinski et al., 2002; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998)
or costly signalling theories (Gintis et al., 2001).
However, recent behavioral experiments show that
humans can perform altruistic acts when interactions
are anonymous and one-shot, i.e. in conditions which
exclude all the explanations proposed so far (Fehr et al.,
2002; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; Fehr and Rockenbach,
2003; Henrich et al., 2001). Indeed, it has been observed
that individuals are ready to punish non-cooperators
(altruistic punishment) as well as to reward cooperative
behavior (altruistic rewarding) even when doing so will
not produce any benefit for the punisher or rewarder.
This set of behaviors has been termed strong reciprocity
(Fehr et al., 2002; Gintis, 2000b) and, as such, it has
been proposed as a schema for understanding altruism
in humans (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis et al.,
2003).
Substantial evidence in favor of the existence of
strong reciprocity comes from experiments using the1
ARTICLE IN PRESSso-called Ultimatum Game (Gu¨th et al., 1982), and from
agent-based models (Bowles et al., 2003b; Bowles and
Gintis, 2004; Boyd et al., 2003) [see (Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis et al., 2003) for summaries].
In the Ultimatum Game, under conditions of anonym-
ity, two players are shown a sum of money, say 100h:
One of the players, the ‘‘proposer’’, is instructed to offer
any amount, from 1h to 100h; to the other, the
‘‘responder’’. The proposer can make only one offer,
which the responder can accept or reject. If the offer is
accepted, the money is shared accordingly; if rejected,
both players receive nothing. Since the game is played
only once (no repeated interactions) and anonymously
(no reputation gain), a self-interested responder will
accept any amount of money offered. Therefore, self-
interested proposers will offer the minimum possible
amount, 1h; which will be accepted. To be sure, this is a
backward-induction way of reasoning, which leads to
the conclusion that the subgame-perfect Nash equili-
brium is the relevant one. However, the Ultimatum
game has many Nash equilibria, which can play a role in
the results we report below (see, e.g. Samuelson, 1997, or
Gintis, 2000a, for complete game-theoretical discussions
on this issue). We will come back to this question in
Section 6. Notwithstanding, in actual Ultimatum Game
experiments with human subjects, average offers do not
even approximate the self-interested prediction. Gen-
erally speaking, proposers offer respondents very sub-
stantial amounts (50% being a typical modal offer) and
respondents frequently reject offers below 30%. Most of
the experiments have been carried out with university
students in western countries, showing a large degree of
individual variability but a striking uniformity between
groups in average behavior. A recent experiment (Gu¨th
et al., 2003) used newspaper readers in order to have a
population with broader characteristics and back-
ground, finding qualitatively similar results. Interest-
ingly, a large study in 15 small-scale societies (Henrich et
al., 2001) found that, in all cases, respondents or
proposers behave in a reciprocal manner. Furthermore,
the behavioral variability across groups was much larger
than previously observed: while mean offers in the case
of university students are in the range 43–48%, in the
cross-cultural study they ranged from 26% to 58%.
The fact that indirect reciprocity is excluded by the
anonymity condition and that interactions are one-shot
allows one to interpret rejections in terms of strong
reciprocity (Fehr et al., 2002; Gintis, 2000b). This
amounts to considering that these behaviors are truly
altruistic, i.e. that they are costly for the individual
performing them in so far as they do not result in direct
or indirect benefit. As a consequence, we immediately
face an evolutionary puzzle: the negative effects of
altruistic acts must decrease the altruist’s fitness as
compared to the that of the recipients of the benefit,
ultimately leading to the extinction of altruists. Indeed,standard evolutionary game theory arguments applied
to the Ultimatum Game lead to the expectation that in a
mixed population, punishers (individuals who reject low
offers) have less chance to survive than rational players
(individuals who accept any offer) and eventually
disappear (Page and Nowak, 2000, 2002). Although
much attention has been devoted to this issue by
researchers in differents aspects of evolutionary theory,
the problem is yet far from understood (Bowles et al.,
2003a; Hammerstein, 2003; Vogel, 2004) To date, the
only way out to this dilemma seems, following the
original suggestion of Darwin (Darwin, 1871), to invoke
group and cultural selection to compensate for the
negative effects that reciprocity is assumed to have on
individuals (Bowles et al., 2003b; Boyd et al., 2003;
Hammerstein, 2003).2. One-parameter model
In order to assess the possible evolutionary origins of
these behaviors, we introduce and analyse here a
drastically simplified model. Imagine a population of
N players of the Ultimatum Game with a fixed sum of
money M per game. Random pairs of players are
chosen, of which one is the proposer and another one is
the respondent. In its simplest version, we will assume
that players are capable of other-regarding behavior
(empathy); consequently, in order to optimize their gain,
proposers offer the minimum amount of money that
they would accept. Every agent has her own, fixed
acceptance threshold, 1ptipM (ti are always integer
numbers for simplicity). Agents have only one strategy:
respondents reject any offer smaller than their own
acceptance threshold, and accept offers otherwise.
Although we believe that this is the way in which
‘‘empathic’’ agents will behave, in order not to hinder
other strategies a priori, we have also considered the
possibility that agents have two independent acceptance
and offer thresholds. As we will see below, this does not
change our main results and conclusions. Money shared
as a consequence of accepted offers accumulates to the
capital of each of the involved players. As our main aim
is to study selection acting on modified descendants,
hereafter we interpret this capital as ‘‘fitness’’ (here used
in a loose, Darwinian sense, not in the more restrictive
one of reproductive rate). After s games, the agent with
the overall minimum fitness is removed (randomly
picked if there are several) and a new agent is introduced
by duplicating that with the maximum fitness, i.e. with
the same threshold and the same fitness (again randomly
picked if there are several). Mutation is introduced in
the duplication process by allowing changes of 71 in
the acceptance threshold of the newly generated player
with probability 13 each. Agents have no memory (i.e.2
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Fig. 1. Non-self-interested behavior establishes spontaneously on
small populations. Population size is N ¼ 1000; the capital to be
shared per game is M ¼ 100: Death and birth takes place after every
game (s ¼ 1). Initial acceptance thresholds are distributed uniformly
(ti ¼ t0 conditions lead to the same output). Plotted are the
distributions of acceptance threshold at the beginning of the
simulation and after 2, 7.5 and 10 million games. Inset: Mean
acceptance threshold as a function of simulated time, is averaged over
intervals of 10 000 games to reduce noise (in the raw data spikes appear
that go above 50 or below 10). The red line in the inset is the average
over all times of the mean, located at 33.45.interactions are one-shot) and no information about
other agents (i.e. no reputation gains are possible).
Two remarks about our model are in order before
proceeding any further. First, we need to clarify the
motivation for our choice of simple, memoryless agents.
It is likely that in early human societies some degree of
repeated interaction and reputation effects was present,
factors that we have excluded from our model. In this
respect, we stress that what we are actually trying to
show is that the behavior observed in the experiments
quoted above (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003), can arise by
individual selection in the absence of precisely those two
ingredients, repeated interactions and reputation: In
other words, the existence of repeated interactions and
reputation is not a necessary condition for the selection
of altruistic-like behaviors at the individual level. In that
case, actual circumstances of human evolution would
reinforce the tendency to the appearance of altruism.
The fact that similar results are found in Ultimatum
game experiments in a wide range of small-scale societies
(Henrich et al., 2001) suggests that our conclusions will
have to be kept in mind when dealing with early human
behavior, as the relevance of these two influences is
largely different in the studied societies. Second, we
want to stress that our mutation rate, which we choose
somewhat large to enhance the fluctuation effects (see
related comments in Section 5 below), should not be
understood from the genetic viewpoint, but rather from
the phenotypical viewpoint. Indeed, the inheritance of
an acceptance threshold like the one we are proposing
may perfectly be also affected by cultural transmission,
and it is therefore subject to a large individual
variability. Observations reported in the literature (Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis et al., 2003) support this
great variability. On the other hand, it has to be borne in
mind that even if the mutation rate may seem large,
mutations are small, with relative changes of the order
of 1100 in the acceptance threshold. We believe that such
changes from parent to child are actually very likely,
and hence our choice for the mutation rate.3. Results
Fig. 1 shows that strong reciprocity, in the form of
altruistic punishment, can be selected for at the
individual level in small populations ranging from N ¼
10 to N ¼ 10 000 agents when selection is strong (s ¼ 1).
The initial distribution of thresholds rapidly leads to a
peaked function, with the range of acceptance thresh-
olds for the agents covering about a 10% of the
available ones. The position of the peak (understood
as the mean acceptance threshold) fluctuates during the
length of the simulation, never reaching a stationary
value for the durations we have explored. The width of
the peak fluctuates as well, but in a much smaller scalethan the position. At certain instants the distribution
exhibits two peaks (see distribution at 7.5 million
games). This is the mechanism by which the position
of the peak moves around the possible acceptance
thresholds. Importantly, the typical evolution we are
describing does not depend on the initial condition. In
particular, a population consisting solely of self-inter-
ested agents, i.e. all initial thresholds are set to ti ¼ 1;
evolves in the same fashion. The value M of the capital
at stake in every game is not important either, and
increasing M only leads to a higher resolution of the
threshold distribution function.
The success of reciprocators does not depend on the
selection rate (although the detailed dynamics does).
Fig. 2 shows the result of a simulation with 1000 agents
in which the removal-duplication process takes place
once every s ¼ 10 000 games. To show further that the
initial conditions are irrelevant, for this plot we have
chosen an initial population of self-interested agents. As
we may see, the evolution is now much less noisy, and
the distribution is narrower, becoming highly peaked
and immobile after a transient. The value of s at which
this regime appears increases with the population size.
The final mean acceptance threshold at which simula-
tions stabilize depends on the specific run, but it is very
generally a value between 40 and 50. We thus see that
the selection rate may be responsible for the particulars
of the simulation outcome, but it is not a key factor for
the emergence of strong reciprocity in our model. We
note, however, that taking very large values for s or,3
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Fig. 2. Slow selection rates lead to stationary acceptance threshold
distributions very narrowly peaked. Population size is N ¼ 1000; the
capital to be shared per game is M ¼ 100 and selection is weak
(s ¼ 10 000). Initial agents are all self-interested (ti ¼ 1). Plotted is the
distribution of acceptance threshold at the end of the simulation. There
are no agents with thresholds outside the plotted range. Inset: Mean
acceptance threshold as a function of simulated time. The asympto-
tically stable mean is very slowly approaching 47.strictly speaking, considering the limit s=N !1; does
lead to different results. See next section for a detailed
discussion.4. Discussion
Among the results summarized above, the evolution
of a population entirely formed by self-interested players
into a diversified population with a large majority of
altruists is the most relevant and surprising one. We will
now argue that the underlying reason for this is the
presence of fluctuations (or noise) in our model. For the
sake of definiteness, let us consider the case s ¼ 1 (agent
replacement takes place after every game) although the
discussion applies to larger (but finite) values of s as
well. After one or more games, a mutation event will
take place and a ‘‘weak altruistic punisher’’ (an agent
with ti ¼ 2) will appear in the population, with a fitness
inherited from its ancestor. For this new agent to be
removed at the next iteration so that the population
reverts to its uniform state, our model rules imply that
this agent has to have the lowest fitness, that is the only
one with that value of fitness, and also that it does not
play as a proposer in the next game (if playing as a
responder the agent will earn nothing because of her
threshold). In any other event this altruistic punisher
will survive at least one cycle, in which an additional one
can appear by mutation. Note also that in case a ‘‘weak
altruistic punisher’’ is chosen to act as a proposer, she
earns a large amount of fitness, which would allow her
to survive for many death–birth cycles, and during thoseshe could even accumulate more fitness in case she is
selected to play again as proposer. It is important to
realize that this does not imply any constraint on the
number of times the emergent weak punisher is picked
up as respondent: in that case, and until a second
punisher arises from mutation, acting as a respondent
the punisher will simply earn nothing, while the selfish
agent playing the role of proposer in that game would
not earn the 99 fitness units she would earn if she met
another selfish agent. Therefore, the survival of the first
punisher does not depend on (and it may actually be
favored by) the number of times she acts as respondent,
as one would expect in a realistic situation.
The above discussion is in fact an example, something
like a worst-case scenario for the s ¼ 1 case, and one can
easily imagine other ways a newly created punisher may
survive. Our intention is to illustrate the crucial fact that
fluctuations (i.e. the fact that the recently appeared
altruist is chosen to play or not, or that it is chosen to be
removed if there are more than one with the lowest
fitness, or other, selfish agents are not selected to play in
one or several intervals) allow for survival and growth of
the population of altruists. It is interesting to note that
in the dynamics in which all players play against every
other once, i.e. in the replicator dynamics (see next
paragraph for more on this), the average fitness earned
by each type of agent can be computed analytically as a
function of the frequency of the types in the population.
From that result, it is easy to find out the threshold
value required for one type to have a fitness advantage
on the other. In particular, it can be shown that if a 3%
of an initial ti ¼ 1 population turns to ti ¼ 2; the latter
ones will outperform the originally self-interested
agents. Note also that, in our model, it can also be
shown that the number of times a particular agent is
chosen to play is a random variable given by a Poisson
distribution of mean s/N (and of standard deviationffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
s=N
p
; which for s=Nb1 becomes negligible with
respect to the mean). Therefore, irrespective of their
threshold, some agents will have played more than
others and may have accumulated more capital, subse-
quently being less exposed to removal. All this scenario
is what we refer to as ‘‘dynamics governed by fluctua-
tions.’’
In the context of the above discussion, it is very
illustrative to compare our results with previous studies
of the Ultimatum Game by Page and Nowak (Page and
Nowak, 2000, 2002). The model introduced in those
works has a dynamics completely different from ours:
following standard evolutionary game theory, every
player plays every other one in both roles (proponent
and respondent), and afterwards players reproduce with
probability proportional to their payoff (which is fitness
in the reproductive sense). Simulations and adaptive
dynamics equations show then that the population ends
up composed by players with fair (50%) thresholds. This4
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Fig. 3. Introduction of an independent level for the amount of money
offered by the agents does not change our conclusions. Population size
is N ¼ 1000; the capital to be shared per game is M ¼ 100 and
selection is intermediate (s ¼ 1000). Initial agents are all fully rational
(ti ¼ oi ¼ 1). Plotted are the distribution of acceptance threshold (red)
and offered amount (green) after 50 million games (dashed) and 100
million games (solid). Upper inset: Mean acceptance threshold and
offered amount as a function of simulated time. The offered amount isis different from our observations, in which we hardly
ever reach an equilibrium (only for large s) and even
then equilibria set up at values different from the fair
share. The reason for this difference is that the
Page–Nowak model dynamics describes the s=N !1
limit of our model, in which between death-reproduc-
tion events the time average gain all players obtain is the
mean payoff with high accuracy. We thus see that our
model is more general because it has one free parameter,
s, that allows selecting different regimes whereas the
Page–Nowak dynamics is only one limiting case. Those
different regimes are what we have described as
fluctuation dominated (when s/N is finite and not too
large) and the regime analysed by Page and Nowak
(when s=N !1). This amounts to saying that by
varying s we can study regimes far from the standard
evolutionary game theory limit. As a result, we find a
variability of outcomes for the acceptance threshold
consistent with the observations in real human societies
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis et al., 2003;
Henrich et al., 2001).most of the time larger than the acceptance threshold, and occasional
crosses lead to a very slow dynamics until the situation is restored (see
the plateaus around 62.5 million games, and corresponding distribu-
tions in the lower inset).
5. Two-parameter model
To further confirm the differences between our
approach and Page and Nowak’s one, we have
considered the same alternative as they did, namely to
assign agents a new strategical variable, oi, defined as the
amount offered by player i when acting as proponent,
and subject to the same mutation rules as the acceptance
threshold, ti. While Page and Nowak observed that in
their setup, this modification of the model led to fully
rational players (i.e. in our model, ti ¼ oi ¼ 1), except
for fluctuations due to mutations. Fig. 3 shows clearly
that in our model the dynamics remains very compli-
cated and equilibria are never reached within the
duration of our simulations. Once again, this is due to
the fact that the dynamics we propose does not remove
the fluctuations of the payoff obtained by the players as
the limit s=N !1 does. It is clear that many other
choices for the dynamics are possible, aside from
choosing different values for s. For instance, a certain
percentage of the population could be replaced in
reproduction events instead of just the least fit
individual. Another possibility would be the selection
of individuals to be replaced with probability given by
their fitness. Notwithstanding, our main point here is
that our dynamics is far away from the replicator or
adaptive ones, and the form we choose for the
replacement is intended to make easier and faster to
visualize the fluctuation effects. Our choice for the large
mutation rate points in the same direction as well, i.e.
helps amplify the effect of fluctuations. In this respect,
the question arises as to the influence of such a large
mutation rate in our results. To exclude any dependenceof our main conclusion, namely the appearance of
altruistic punishers even in an initially selfish popula-
tion, on the value of this quantity, we simulated the
same model for smaller mutation rates. Fig. 4 shows
clearly that even for mutation rates as small as 13000 the
population is taken over by the altruistic punishers,
although at a correspondingly larger time. Of course,
the larger the mutation rate, the wider the histogram of
the population, and therefore, for the smallest values the
acceptance threshold distribution is very sharply peaked
around the mean value (see inset in Fig. 3). For even
smaller rates (of the order of 104 or similar genetic
mutation rates) the amount of time needed for altruistic
individuals to establish becomes exceedingly large, and
out of the scope of our computing capabilities. We
believe that different rules for the dynamics would lead
to qualitatively similar results in so far as they do not
approach Page and Nowak’s (which we could call
deterministic) limit.6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that altruistic-like
behavior, specifically, altruistic punishment, may arise
by means of exclusive individual selection even in the
absence of repeated interactions and reputation gains.
Our conclusion is important in so far as it is generally
believed that some kind of group selection is needed to5
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Fig. 4. Simulation results do not depend on the mutation rate.
Population size is N ¼ 10 000; the capital to be shared per game is
M ¼ 100: Death and birth takes place after every game (s ¼ 1). Initial
agents are all self-interested (ti ¼ 1). Plotted is the mean value of the
acceptance threshold vs. time in number of games (which for s ¼ 1
equals the number of generations). Mutation rates are as indicated in
the plot. Inset: Distribution of the acceptance threshold at the end of
each of the simulations. The fact that the peak of every distribution is
displaced to the left for larger mutation rates is an irrelevant
coincidence: The peak positions fluctuate in time (as indicated by the
mean value in the main plot).understand the observed human behavior. The reason
for that is that game theoretical arguments apparently
show that altruists are at disadvantage with respect to
selfish individual. In this respect, another relevant
conclusion of the present work is that perspectives and
approaches alternative to standard evolutionary game
theory may be needed in order to understand paradox-
ical features such as the appearance of altruistic
punishment. We begin by discussing this second con-
clusion and proceed to the first one afterwards.
As we have seen, in our model the effects of finite time
between generations (more precisely, the effect of
keeping s finite) and of stochasticity play a non trivial
role and sustain strong reciprocity (existence of players
with ti41) even if acceptance and offer obey indepen-
dent rules. Regarding this, it is important to notice that
the way fluctuations enter our model is directly through
the evolutionary dynamics we propose. Other important
effects of noise have been reported in the literature (Gale
et al., 1995; Binmore and Samuelson, 1999) in which
fluctuations are included into a replicator dynamics for
the Ultimatum game to account for imperfections in the
learning process. In our case, there is no learning at all
(agents have no memory) and therefore the source of
noise is the dynamics itself, i.e. the random differences
between the number of games every player plays
between selection events. Interestingly, randomness
arising from finiteness of the population has also been
shown to change the evolutionary stability of coopera-
tion (Nowak et al., 2004). In a related context, it hasbeen recently reported that spatial structure, previously
regarded as beneficial for the evolution of cooperation
on the basis of results on the evolutionary Prisoner’s
Dilemma, may in fact inhibit it (Hauert and Doebeli,
2004). Finally, let us also mention the recent results
about the evolution of strong altruism in randomly
formed groups when they exist for more than one
generation (Fletcher and Zwick, 2004). All these
unexpected and non-trivial results, along with our
present report suggest that general approaches, invol-
ving different, non-standard dynamics, beyond standard
evolutionary game theory, and particularly computer
simulations of agent models, may provide insights into
the issue of how cooperation arises. Interestingly, it has
been argued that empathy (or fairness), i.e. the fact that
agents offer what they themselves are prepared to
accept, does not arise evolutionary on its own (Page
and Nowak, 2002). While those results are not
questioned, they have been obtained in the framework
of adaptive dynamics. We believe, along the same line of
reasoning we are presenting here, that the effect of
fluctuations as described in the previous section may be
enough to originate and sustain fairness in finite
populations, which would in turn justify our model
from the game theoretical viewpoint. In this regard, an
interesting question arises when one considers the
possibility of observing similar behavior in dilemma-
type games (such as the prisonner’s dilemma, see
Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). In that kind of games,
the Nash equilibrium structure is much simpler than in
the Ultimatum game: Usually, they have only one
equilibrium. It may then be that in those situations,
departure from that equilibrium by individual selection
alone without additional ingredients is much more
difficult. In other words, the existence of numerous
Nash equilibria in the Ultimatum game may facilitate
the creative role of the fluctuations in leading the
population away from the self-interested type. It would
be interesting to analyse the case of dilemma-type games
in the light of our findings here. Work along these lines
is in progress.
Evolutionary explanations of strong reciprocity have
been advanced in terms of gene-culture coevolution
(Bowles et al., 2003b; Bowles and Gintis, 2004; Boyd et
al., 2003; Gintis, 2003; Hammerstein, 2003; Henrich and
Boyd, 2001). The underlying rationale is that altruistic
behavior leads to fitness disadvantages at the individual
level. But why must strong reciprocators have lower
fitness than other members of their group? While
alternative compensating factors (e.g. sexual selection)
have been suggested (Bowles et al., 2003a), our results
show clearly that, in the context of the Ultimatum
Game, altruistic punishment (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002)
may be established by individual selection alone. Our
simulations are consistent with the large degree of
variability among individuals (Fehr and Fischbacher,6
ARTICLE IN PRESS2003; Gintis et al., 2003) and among societies (Henrich
et al., 2001), and reproduce the fact that typical offers
are much larger than self-interested ones, but lower than
a fair share. While in our model agents have other-
regarding behavior (empathy), i.e. agents offer the
minimum they would accept if offered to them, this is
not a requisite for the emergence of strong reciprocators
as the two-threshold simulations show. The population
evolves by descent with modification and individual
selection, as the model does not implement cultural
(other than parent-to-child transmission) or group
selection of any kind. To be sure, we do not mean that
these mechanisms are irrelevant for the appearance and
shaping of altruism: what we are showing is that strong
reciprocity (and hence altruism) may arise in their
absence. Observations of strongly reciprocal behavior in
capucin monkeys (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003), where
cultural transmission, if any, is weak, strengthens this
conclusion. Further support for our thesis comes from
reports of individual, pre-existent acceptance thresholds
shown by neural activity measurements in (Sanfey et al.,
2003). In this respect, neural mechanisms gratifying
cooperation as those demonstrated in (Rilling et al.,
2002) may have evolved to reinforce behaviors selected
for at the individual level as we are suggesting. Of
course, those results do not preclude cultural influences
in the brain control of altruistic behavior, which may
play an important part in determining the experimen-
tally observed thresholds. What is more relevant here is
that individual thresholds do exist, with a large amount
of individual variability, much like in our model, instead
of a single culturally prescribed threshold. Evidence
seems to favor one common threshold for acceptance
and rejection but it is not strong enough to exclude the
other version of the model. The detrimental effects of
unfair sanctions on altruism (Fehr and Rockenbach,
2003) is yet another piece of evidence in favor of the
existence of such individual acceptance (‘‘fairness’’)
thresholds.
In closing, let us emphasize that our conclusion that
altruism does not necessarily have negative consequences
for individuals draws such theories nearer to a biological
perspective. Indeed, our results suggest that, despite its
not being self-evident, altruistic strategies may do better
in terms of fitness than selfish ones, even without
repeated interactions or reputation gain. This conclu-
sion, which would imply that strictly speaking there is no
truly altruistic behavior, may have far-reaching implica-
tions in decision-making models and the design of public
policies (Bowles et al., 2003a; Vogel, 2004).Acknowledgments
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